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ABSTRACT 
 
Under what conditions can technology ventures design and implement a sustainable Intellectual 
Property Business Model? Many new firms in technology-intensive domains seek to adopt such models.  
This enables them to focus limited resources on core areas of competence, but raises significant 
challenges. These include the reluctance of customers to license the technology until it is generating 
value in applications and the  experimentation needed to identify appropriate applications and markets, 
especially for generic technologies. Complementary assets must be fostered to transfer the technology 
across the value chain. Protecting the IP during scale up is problematic. In this paper we offer a detailed 
study of a firm that succeeded in overcoming these challenges, ARM plc. We attempt to identify what 
aspects of their experience (of IP generated growth) are generalizable to other firms. We define a 
business model as the way the firm is organized to create and capture value. We explore the kind of 
business ecosystem that must be nurtured for a firm to sustain growth through value creation and capture 
based on an intellectual property business model and find that reciprocity of benefits across the business 
ecosystem is needed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
An  intellectual property-based  business model (henceforth IPBM) operates in the 
market for technological knowledge rather than in markets for goods and services 
(Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2001). The key competence of the firm is its ability to 
create, own, market, and sell intellectual property (IP). Many new firms in 
technology-intensive domains (e.g., semiconductors, biotech, nanotechnology) go to 
market adopting IPBMs. It appears to be a model that may be especially well-suited to 
start-ups that have deep technological know-how, together with a lack of resources 
and experience, as it allows them to focus on what they do best while outsourcing the 
manufacturing and distributed marketing efforts to third parties. But although benefits 
include reduced capital requirements and focused use of limited resources on core 
areas of competence, there are significant challenges in adopting an IPBM. First, it 
calls for a specialized division of labor between organizations. Yet transferring 
technology across different organizations differently positioned along the value chain 
is chronically challenging. Second, patented inventions require the support of 
complementary assets to ensure that the customer is offered a value proposition 
(Teece, 1986). Unless the customers can see the intellectual property (IP) applied in 
use, they may not be prepared to pay for it. Third, the new venture must protect this 
value to guarantee a durable competitive advantage (Gans, Shu and Stern, 2008), 
while simultaneously creating the conditions for scaling up the venture. Fourth, for 
technologies with broad applicability,  identifying the most suitable market segment 
may require extensive experimentation (Maine and Garnsey 2006). As a result, and 
especially so in science-based startups that operate under conditions of great 
uncertainty, business models are likely to evolve in unanticipated ways, requiring 
emergent design choices as new market targets are identified. Fifth, new technology 
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ventures are especially exposed to the potential of contractual hazards (e.g. Pisano, 
1990) that is, the risk that the buyer might appropriate part of the value of its 
proprietary knowledge without paying for it (Katila et al., 2008), a problem first 
described by Arrow (1962). These challenges are considerable. Not surprisingly, there 
are several instances of new companies that adopted an IPBM in the early stage that 
did not succeed in sustaining such model over time. Firms such as Cambridge Display 
Technology in electronic displays, Qualcomm in semiconductors or Plastic Logic in 
plastic electronics, which started with a pure play intellectual property business 
model, have progressively abandoned it (Davis, 2008). The point is that investing in 
the development of IP before the broader array of factors involved in creating and 
capturing value are in evidence is unlikely to pay off. Although increasing attention 
has been placed on better understanding the nature of the challenges faced by 
technology start-ups attempting to commercialize IP, the equally important issue of 
how to overcome these challenges and craft sustainable business models has received 
less attention. Building on these premises, in this paper we pose a fundamental 
question: Under what conditions can technology ventures design and implement 
sustainable IPBM? Or, to put it differently, under what conditions can an IPBM be 
source of sustainable growth? 
To start addressing these questions both empirically and theoretically, we 
focus on ARM Holdings plc, a UK company that pioneered the concept of openly-
licensable IP for the development of 32-bit RISC processor-based system-on-chip 
(SoC) in the early 1990s. ARM, in just a few years from its founding became the 
number one semiconductor IP supplier in the world and one of the few European 
technological start-ups to gain a share of the world market. Our aim in using a single 
in-depth case is to employ evidence to inform theory in an empirical exemplar that 
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helps delineate concepts and connecting ideas.1 The insights we derive from this 
revelatory case study are based on rich qualitative evidence collected over almost two 
decades through an extensive interview program as well as internal documents, 
newspaper articles and other secondary sources.  As documented elsewhere (Garnsey 
et al., 2008; Ferriani et al., 2012), in the course of repeated company visits we carried 
out a number of unstructured interviews with senior managers, engineers, and 
managers who had extensive knowledge of the origin and subsequent development of 
ARM’s strategic approach to licensing and IP management. We use this rich evidence 
to unpack ARM’s capabilities and shed light on the distinctive features on ARM’s IP-
BM. This allows us to distil some preliminary insights concerning the viability and 
potential of an IP BM to be source of sustained growth. In particular, we elaborate on 
two types of challenges, which in our view are especially salient for the  sustainability 
of IPBMs over time, namely IP protection and scalability. In both cases we find that   
the business model co-evolved with the creation of a business ecosystem that ARM 
was able to dominate. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start by tracing the origins of ARM and 
its evolving trajectory to show how, starting from a narrow technological space and 
limited strategic landscape, the company managed to sustain rapid growth, making the 
transition from proof of concept, to prototyping through to commercialization and 
scaling. The early stages, while not the primary focus of our inquiry, allow us to 
underscore the evolutionary trajectory of ARM and trace it to early choices, in 
particular technological design choices and BM design choices (Casadesus-Masanell 
& Ricart, 2010). Next, we discuss the process that led to the creation of a worldwide 
                                                          
1
 A single case study does not aim to be representative. But in influential studies, a single case has 
provided a new perspective on wider issues. Among these are Penrose’s Hercules Powder case 
(Penrose, 1960), the inspiration for her Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959), Burgelman’s account 
of strategic change at Intel (1994) and Edgar Schein’s work on Digital Equipment Corporation in his 
book on organizational culture (Schein, 2003). 
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standard, focusing in particular on the company’s orchestration of multiple partners 
and the intertwined activities of third parties. In doing that we seek to illustrate how 
relational capabilities were coupled with micro tactics enabling the orchestration of 
the network (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006), which came to constitute an evolving 
ecosystem (Adner et al. 2013). This provided the business environment that enabled 
ARM to sustain the competitive advantage offered by the IPBM while scaling the 
firm. Finally, we focus on the appropriability regime enacted by ARM to prevent 
imitation and manage the litigation space. We show that these aspects, namely 
network orchestration and relational capabilities, IP protection and scalability, are 
related in a mutually reinforcing fashion.  
Overall, our findings extend the literature examining the effective management 
of technological innovations in new ventures. In particular, our approach to analyzing 
intellectual property goes beyond patent analysis to examine directly the nuances and 
subtleties implied in the development of a global IP capability. These observations 
have implications for managers in a variety of IP-oriented industries. 
 
 
ARM: THE ORIGINS  
To understand ARM’s business model it is important to trace back its origins to Acorn 
Computer. ARM (Advanced Risc Machines) was born out of the research labs of 
Acorn Computer in November 1990. Acorn was keen to develop a range of computers 
with a greater capacity but at a low cost in order to meet the needs of its cash-strapped 
customers.  Initially Acorn had purchased its microprocessors from Ferranti, but in 
1982 and 1983 this resulted in serious quality problems leading the Board to decide to 
encourage in-house development of a microprocessor. Accordingly Acorn developed 
a dedicated unit devoted to microprocessor development and selected a RISC design 
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approach. A Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) chip is a microprocessor 
designed to perform only the most common types of computer instructions, so it can 
work at a higher speed.  On April 13 1984, the first RISC microprocessor came out of 
an Acorn dedicated lab, manufactured by Plessey to power Acorn’s Archimedes 
computer. It was the beginning of a microprocessor revolution, delivering a solution 
which did the same amount of work compared to other 16-bit microprocessor but used 
one tenth of the transistors, with a huge reduction in energy consumption.  The 
reduced size of the ARM  chip, one16th of the size of the INTEL 486, meant less 
silicon was required for production, thus making it cheap.  More significantly, the 
reduced power consumption meant that it could be run off a much smaller battery, 
strengthening its position as a leading microprocessor for embedded applications (see 
Box 1 for more details on the characteristics of ARM enabling technology).   
 
Box 1 ARM’s RISC Enabling Technology 
ARM licenses its enabling technology or architecture to partners who use it to design 
and then manufacture the final chip. The term ‘architecture’ is used within the field of 
electronic engineering to refer to high-level microchip design. In essence, an 
architecture identifies the design logic behind a chip, and defines how a processor 
must operate. An architecture may include the programmers model, the instruction 
set, system configuration, exception handling, and the memory model. There are two 
broad categories of chip architecture, built around different design parameters: 
Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) and Reduced Instruction Set Computing 
(RISC). CISC has around 300 instructions in its instruction set, including complex 
instruction. It can be programmed upstream using a reduced set of instructions, 
relying on the comprehensive set of instructions already available in the chip 
architecture. CISC is the de facto standard in the desktop PC applications, in which 
high speed is critical and power consumption is of little concern. On the contrary, the 
portable devices market, where low power consumption and cost represent significant 
design factors, is nowadays dominated by RISC technologies, which rely on a simpler 
and more agile design that allow design of power efficient and low cost chips. ARM 
defines architecture specifications that specify how ARM products must operate. 
Additionally, some partners license the right to implement their own ARM processors 
conforming to the architecture specifications. This leads to a hierarchical split into 
three levels of specifications which together describe the behavior and programmer 
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model of the entire SoC: 
 
- Architecture: an architecture defines behavior that is common to many processor 
designs. 
- Processor: a processor is the implementation of an architecture, and can be 
integrated into several different designs. 
- Device: a device contains a processor and additional components 
 
Source: Davis (2008); ARM internal documentation (Architectures, Processors, and 
Devices Development Article Copyright © 2009 ARM Limited). 
 
The bulk of the advanced R&D section of Acorn that succeeded in developing 
the ARM microprocessors family of products was composed of 12 engineers, and 
formed the basis of ARM Ltd when that company was founded. This occurred as a 
result of the growing interest in the RISC technology from Apple Computers in 
California. At the end of the 1980s, Apple was working on a new architecture for 
handheld devices and believed that there would be a market for a personal digital 
assistant (PDA) for business executives. To this end a joint venture was proposed 
between Apple Computers, the newly founded ARM and VLSI to develop a 
microprocessor for what they named the Newton notepad. This enabled ARM to gain 
leverage from the extensive technological expertise it had inherited from Acorn 
Computers. As one of the founders of the new company explained to us in 1990 (at 
the time of founding):  
 
It is a bit of a wretch to separate what was an integral part of Acorn, but 
we have decided that ARM and Acorn are best served by the creation of a 
separate company. The deal opens up many possibilities in terms of 
product development which we (at Acorn) probably would not have been 
able to afford. 
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ARM started with £ 1.75 million of seed capital (£ 1.5 million from Apple + £. 
250,000 from VLSI) while Acorn’s original expertise and development was valued at 
£ 1.5 million.  In those days, microchip factories cost around half a billion dollars.   
Manufacturing was clearly not an option, but other ways of entering the microchip 
market could be envisioned.  An alternative could have been to subcontract 
manufacturing but this would have meant paying the subcontractor and 
commercializing the manufacturing and bearing the costs of sales and marketing 
activities. After evaluation of the various alternatives (see Table 1), the choice was 
made to license to multiple partners and to aim to ensure the technology became the 
global standard, maintained through systematic innovation. 
ARM’s original business plan had been to license their RISC technology to 
computer companies like Acorn and Apple, with production being licensed to VLSI. 
Robin Saxby took over as CEO in 1991, a few months after the  launch of ARM. The 
Apple Newton Notebook was not a success2 in the market, greatly reducing the 
demand initially anticipated in their business plan. A rethink to the business model 
was required. Other companies had already taken the IP route by becoming ‘fab-less’ 
IP companies, contracting out the manufacture of their chips. ARM took one step 
further and decided that they would be a ‘chipless, chip company’. As a purely 
intellectual property firm, ARM would license its chip design to semiconductor 
companies.  The new strategic goal was to make ARM's RISC chip design a global 
standard:  
                                                          
2
 In the late 90s with Steve Jobs in exile and the company teetering on ruin, Apple came to sell its stake 
in ARM for a staggering $800 million and that saved the company from near bankruptcy. 
As recently stated by Sir Hermann Hauser, founder of Acorn, “at the time, they (Apple) were in real 
trouble, real financial trouble, and in fact they were about to go bust,” “The reason they didn’t go bust 
was because they sold their ARM stake that they had originally purchased for $1.5 million for $800 
million.” (http://www.cultofmac.com/97055/this-is-how-arm-saved-apple-from-going-bust-1990s/) 
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"To be the world standard, we had to get partners everywhere in parallel. 
And to get partners everywhere in parallel, we had to license the 
technology many times. That's the order of thinking". 
 
ARM’s Strategic Options 
 CONTENT CUSTOMER RELATIONS 
 
CONSULTING 
 
Tailor made (on request) 
content (provide 
solutions/insights on 
specific issues) 
 
 
One shot (project dependent) / 
Renewable 
LICENSING Licensing + royalties 
 
Several potential customers 
(typically few license renewals) 
 
 
I.P. BUSINESS 
MODEL 
License + royalties + 
services 
Systematic product upgrade 
Global standard 
Multiple repeated partnerships 
(customer lock-in) 
 
Table 1: ARM’s strategic options. 
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This strategic approach enabled ARM to rapidly infiltrate multiple markets becoming 
indispensable to its customers and customers’ customers who had extensive market 
reach. At the same time ARM signaled its credibility though consequent prestigious 
endorsements.. By associating itself with established powerful incumbents, ARM 
could convey a stronger identity in the industry.  These early connections and 
contracts with big clients were critical in addressing a major issue facing any new 
company namely, lack of legitimacy and limited availability of resources. 
 
BOUNDARY EVOLUTION  
Because ARM’s designs were for multi-purpose products and their customers 
operated in a variety of markets, ARM’s boundaries evolved as their customer base 
grew. Young companies relying on IP business models face an acute need to construct 
a supportive ecosystem for leveraging the IP (Adner et al. 2013). In an ecosystem, 
participants generate value collectively but the ecosystem also enables individual 
units to create and capture the value required for their own survival (Li and Garnsey 
2013). It can also be seen that the firm infiltrates the market through its ecosystem 
linkages whereby it develops an identity as a core constituent of the ecosystem that its 
activities help to create. At the outset, ARM had very narrow boundaries operating in 
a restricted niche within the fragmented semiconductor industry, but the business 
model triggered the development of multiple partnerships across a variety of market 
spaces working on modularity at the component level of industry organization. 
 
SETTING A GLOBAL STANDARD 
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The computer industry had already shifted from vertical integration to horizontal 
specialization with the entry of new specialized component players like Intel and 
Microsoft.  Horizontally specialized firms became the innovators in their domain and 
had a deep influence on product/technology evolution, requiring the compatibility of 
modules and standards (Florida and Kenney 1990).  Acorn Computers had failed to 
gain the market penetration required to establish an industry standard. In contrast 
Robin Saxby encouraged people at ARM to think in terms of standards:   
"To some extent none of us knew what it (a global standard) meant but 
you got a bunch of creative people thinking ' Yeah, this is where we are 
going. We must do things that help it become a standard. We must not do 
things that don't. We must ignore the things that don't"  
ARM was a driver and a participant contributing to the creation of the new 
horizontal organization of the industry and the new technological and organizational 
detachability. Through progressive experimentation, learning by doing, they 
developed the basis for backward integration building on the principles of modularity 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000), reusability and adaptability. Developing   highly flexible 
architectures for microprocessors and allowing a mix of architectural components to 
be configured around the core was the basis for modularity, reusability and 
adaptability at ARM.  As a result of architectural extensions, (e.g. the Thumb, the 
Piccolo, AMBA and Embedded CE), it became possible to open up new performance 
space for ARM’s microprocessors, allowing entrance into new markets for embedded 
applications (see Figure 1). Originally developed for ARM7TDMI and ARM9TDMI, 
they were compatible with subsequent ARM core microprocessors.     
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Figure, 1. ARM product innovation (1992-1999). Source: company reports. 
The modularity of the architecture allowed the setup of different client-packages with 
basic modules being turned into specific contracts and deliverables. As one of our 
company informants told us:  
"In the agreement, the needs of the licensee may vary considerably. The 
Koreans for example, who are not so familiar with certain 
microcontrollers and microprocessors, as they have never had their own 
in-house design, will say ‘tell us what you've got, and help us to decide 
what we need, and then hold our hands through the process’.  On the 
other hand, we may have a very experienced manufacturer, who has 
designed their own processors and controllers in the past, and they will 
define precisely what they need and this contract can be signed at arm's 
length. We have to be receptive, adaptable and flexible to the different 
requirements and specifications. Over the years contracts have been done 
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many times and so we know with reasonable certainty what the 
semiconductor companies want in advance"  
The flexibility and modularity of this approach has had a key role in shaping the 
company boundaries, allowing the technology to cover a broad market space. Indeed, 
ARM defined a multi-market space for its offerings, with services reaching its 
customers’ customers.  Eventually ARM broadened its portfolio of microprocessors 
so as to encompass three families of microprocessor which are virtually able to cover 
the entire market for embedded applications (see Table 2 below). Combined with the 
strategic orientation towards setting a global standard, this approach conferred on 
ARM the ability to exert a strong control over market dynamics. A standard confers 
competitive advantage for the owner firm by definition. Flexibility and modularity 
allow it to be present in several interconnected markets at the same time and gain 
understanding of the evolutionary dynamics within those markets. This can be 
achieved if the innovator forges relationships with key players in the diverse markets 
as the basis for an emerging ecosystem of connected participants; strong alliance 
capabilities are required for such a strategy. 
 
THE THIRD PARTY SUPPLIERS  
The ARM business model relies on third parties upstream and multiple parties 
downstream to access markets. To better understand the structure of such alliance 
network a short excursus into the structure of the semiconductor industry is necessary. 
The increasing trend towards relying on “System on Chip” (SoC) and “System on 
Package” in developing integrated circuits (ICs) has been accompanied by new IC 
design approaches that rely on modular, reusable components that are then integrated 
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into a single SoC. This trend has been paralleled by a vertical disintegration of the 
value chain and a proliferation of companies each focusing on developing core 
competencies and capabilities around a limited number of components. The functions 
of IC specification, design, fabrication, packaging, and testing, which were originally 
performed by single vertically integrated design manufacturers (IDM) have separated 
into functions carried out by several firms (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: vertical disintegration of the value chain in the 
semiconductor industry (adapted from Su, Hung & Cheng, 2005) 
To provide a complete design solution to customers, several IP providers (including 
ARM) must collaborate with one another and also with third parties providing 
necessary complementary capabilities and technologies. Third parties include 
providers of software for integrated circuit design, i.e., Electronic Design Automation 
(EDA), as well as design service providers. While the former provide platforms for IP 
configuration, the latter could be considered to be mediating firms that provide 
various design services and even turnkey solutions that may include a coordination of 
downstream activities required for manufacturing. As the figure shows, ARM 
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operates at the center of this complex ecosystem. While the realization of an IC design 
relies on the competences and technologies supplied by firms that operate upstream in 
the value chain, including ARM (Williamson, 2012), the physical realization of the 
system on a chip (SoC) occurs downstream and involves other tasks (such as 
manufacturing, assembly and testing) and cooperation with other parties, including 
mask suppliers, foundries and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  
Because of the highly fragmented architecture of the industry, ARM has to 
orchestrate a complex network of exchange partners that, as of 2012, comprises more 
than 900 players (Garnsey et al., 2008).  This orchestration effort entails managing 
two different types of challenges with partners. Upstream (and horizontal) interaction 
occurs at the design stage, and involves integration of the services and capabilities 
provided by third parties, tools for electronic design automation and design service 
firms. From the point of view of ARM (but also from that of other upstream players) 
this implies developing technologies and solutions characterized by a high degree of 
compatibility with technologies provided by other parties. However, because of this 
technological interdependency and the modular nature of final design solutions 
(which integrate competencies and IPs provided by various specialized players), 
challenges emerge in terms of the potential for IP infringement. This phenomenon has 
been widely documented in the literature (Grindley & Teece 1997). The industry has 
progressively solved the problem by increasingly relying on cross licensing 
agreements.  Issues occurring downstream tend to revolve around problems associated 
with IP protection and the technological roadmap. 
. 
ORCHESTRATING MULTIPLE PARTNERS 
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The upstream, stand-alone position of a standard design supplier can only be reached 
with the orchestration of a complex system of partners involved in manufacturing and 
serving the final user (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Lipparini et al., 2013). The number 
of partnerships signed by ARM scaled very rapidly. In 1991, ARM signed the first 
contracts outside the circle of the original equity partners, with GEC-Plessey.   One of 
the members involved in the negotiation inside Plessey paraphrased the essence of the 
selling approach as follows:  
"We have got this core. It must be useful to people for something. We don't 
really know how you might want to use it but we are prepared to work 
with you to understand it".   
In 1993, ARM signed a second partnership with Sharp and, in 1995,  a contract 
with Texas Instruments: both contracts represented a turning point in ARM’s 
development because of the size and the reputation of the players. T.I. was trying to 
complement its DSP system with ARM CPU in order to package a solution to Nokia 
mobile phones. Nokia fed back with a list of unsolved requirements based on a 
reduction of power consumption and code size and they started to work together in 
order to make further steps forward. Ultimately, the collaboration resulted in the 
creation of an innovative architectural extension (Thumb) which was developed to fill 
the technological gap between ARM’s existing technology and Nokia Technical 
requirements. These interactions turned out to be foundational for delineating the core 
triadic structure that characterizes ARM’s collaborative model. The triad involves 
three partners, a software firm, a hardware manufacturer and an industrial user who 
ultimately commercialize the final product (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: The partnership triad 
 
Within the triad ARM is the recipient of manufacturing information from TI 
and, at the same time, is the recipient of market information from Nokia. This 
combined match of different information sources, multiplied by the many triads in 
which ARM is nowadays involved, contributes to the definition of ARM’s 
technological roadmap. As Peter Magowan, Executive Vice President of Business 
Development, explained to us:  
“By ‘speaking’ to OEMs we achieved a number of objectives: firstly, we 
exposed them to the full range of possibilities available from the ARM 
products and ARM development environment; secondly, we found out 
what they most wanted as features from their processors and secured 
design wins; thirdly, we gained their trust, as we delivered on promises; 
fourthly, we brought them into the fold of ARM architecture and 
standard”.  
Industrial Consumer
(commercialization)
OEM
e.g. Nokia
Foundry
(Manufacturing)
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The most important effect of this triadic engagement is the contribution that it makes 
to the discovery of new opportunities and the identification of different types of user 
problems and customers’ emerging needs.  
This strong partnership orientation became part of ARM’s broad culture early 
on, which included technicians and engineers who were deliberately involved in 
customer meetings to elicit bonding at a deep technical level. The very term customer 
was replaced by partner to strengthen the relevance and significance of relational 
elements. The distinction is an important one, as illustrated by ARM co-founder 
James Urquart, referring to semiconductor companies working with ARM: 
The semi-conductor companies were our partners, not our customers. 
They paid us money. They were where the money came from, but 
ultimately it was thanks to them that our technology could make it into a 
product that final users would buy. So, we had to work with them and 
understand where their customers were using the technology, why their 
customer used the technology, what where the advantages, what where the 
problems. 
Robin Saxby, CEO of ARM, adds that: 
We really treat our customers as partners involving them in agreeing 
specifications and taking joint-risk and benefiting on projects. […] We 
are in daily communication with 78 semiconductor manufacturing 
companies globally, […] we visit their factories and work with them on 
site. It’s just that we do not own the manufacturing plant.    
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The connections with third party suppliers and the leveraging of information and 
expertise from technology partners create a powerful intelligence network which 
feeds ARM’s continuous innovation and development of product families. Continuous 
innovation is important to maintain the standard and make it flourish. Indeed, as 
patents expire and technology gets outdated, a continuous flow of innovation is 
necessary to nourish the standard. Figure 4 below illustrates an uninterrupted path of 
innovation in power efficiency outcomes relying on core  microprocessors (and 
architectural extension not shown here).  Table 2 shows the domains of application for 
ARM’s products. 
 
 
Figure 4: ARM portfolio of Processors Source: company records 
Through the gradual development of its expertise and global reach, ARM ensured that 
it became the preferred supplier of microprocessor design for Apple’s iPhone and 
iPad, enabling ARM’s designs to reach millions of customers of new generations of 
smart phones (Morrissey, 2010) 
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As we seek to draw some preliminary lessons from a description of how complex 
early network effects influenced the IP business model and came to provide  for ARM 
a supportive business ecosystem, we must also emphasize the barriers to imitation 
resulting from the combined coupling of technological architecture and organizational 
architecture. The combination of knowledge and practices underlying the technical 
and organizational network creates "causal ambiguity" for any imitators attempting to 
replicate the unknown success factors behind a technology, making imitation unlikely 
(Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999).  Moreover, the fast evolution of the product families 
over the years through the tight involvement of third parties and partners creates a 
lock-in effect, with high switching costs to customers considering alternative sources 
of technology. 
 
ARM’s portfolio of processors 
 
Classic ARM 
Processors 
Embedded CORTEX 
Processors 
Application CORTEX 
processors 
Description Classic processors, 
based on ARM 
classic architecture, 
offering market-
proven technologies 
for cost sensitive 
solutions 
Processors delivering high 
deterministic real-time 
behavior in power sensitive 
application. These 
processors typically 
execute a Real-Time 
Operating System (RTOS) 
alongside user-developed 
application code.  
Processors able to execute 
complex Operating Systems 
(e.g. Linux, Android, 
Windows or Symbian) and to 
enable complex graphic user 
interface. Equipped with a 
Memory Management Unit 
(MMU) 
Applications General: wide range • Automotive Control • Smart-phones 
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of performance 
capabilities for cost 
sensitive solution 
 
Systems 
• Motor control Systems 
• White Goods 
controllers 
• Wireless and Wired 
Sensor Networks 
• Mass Storage 
Controllers 
• Printers 
• Network Devices 
• Feature Phones 
• Netbooks/e-readers 
• Advanced personal media 
player 
• Digital Television 
• Set-top boxes & satellite 
receivers 
• Personal navigation 
devices 
Table 2: ARM CPUs families and applications 
THE APPROPRIABILITY REGIME  
David Teece’s influential contribution sets the stage for a better understanding of the 
conditions for gaining rents from technological innovation (Teece, 1986). In 
particular, Teece (1986) focuses on the role of the appropriability regime - weak or 
strong - in protecting innovation from potential attackers. In a weak appropriability 
regime barriers to imitation can be built, leveraging on complementary specialized 
assets in addition to technical and legal assets.  In a strong regime, technical and legal 
assets are available to master and defend the appropriation of rents. Companies select 
their rent-capture strategy depending on specific regimes (Pisano, 2006). Strong 
appropriability regimes are characterized by the presence of strong legal and patent 
mechanisms. Interestingly enough, while ARM has registered a relevant number of 
patents over the years, the size and litigation potential of the legal unit is relatively 
small. This apparent contradiction, suggests that other mechanisms may be at the 
foundation of ARM’s ability to shape the appropriability regime.  
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In the early days ARM founders were well aware that if they had a problem 
with IP appropriation, they did not have the resources to engage in litigation on a solo 
basis. However, they also knew that pressure on potential imitators could be brought 
to bear by Apple Computers. More crucially, as the company was growing and 
gaining new customers, ARM started entering into cross patent licensing deals, thus 
reducing the litigation space. Partnerships with large OEMs operate as signals that 
also generate barriers to imitation. As pointed out by one of our informants: 
“If a company like Samsung or TI is licensing from us, this means it may 
be difficult to develop our technology.”  
Multiple licenses create a psychological barrier to entry. In addition, the IP that 
is licensed needs to be complemented by ARM’s customer services and considerable 
expertise which is not fully codified (nor codifiable) in the transacted IP. This aspect 
works as a protection mechanism. For example, licensors need expertise from ARM at 
various stages, including testing, debugging, and production. This illustrates how 
ARM license position preempts litigation by removing incentives for it.  
 
In the light of the above observations we can distil four important insights:  
a) ARM is a "chip-less chip company" providing architectural design and not relying 
on either manufacturing rents nor preferences of final consumers;  
b) The positioning of ARM is far upstream from the final market but this potentially 
vulnerable position is coupled with IP in RISC design that is the acknowledged 
technology standard with massive market share.  
c) The global standard of its designs, achieved through multiple long term market 
partnerships, supports the thesis that a strong appropriability regime is based on 
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idiosyncratic knowledge and social mechanisms (i.e., IP protection arises from  
relationships and BM design).  
d) At the same time, strategic and organizational barriers have been built up to lock 
in the market. High barriers to entering or copying are generated by tailor-made 
solutions for customers’ customers who rely on the modularity, reusability and 
high adaptability of the ARM offer. Associated product flexibility creates 
technology and market options for the partners and facilitates integration and 
continuity of the ties.  
Table 3 below offers a summary of the key micro-dynamics underlying ARM’s 
IPBM. At the core of ARM’s IPBM sustainability is the co-evolution of technological 
innovation (modular architecture) and BM (scaled evolution). An IPBM comes with 
the advantage of offering  quick access to market by means of a capital-light model 
which allows the firm to concentrate on its core technological capabilities without 
having to sustain the investments necessary to move into manufacturing. This also 
allows retaining the ability to exploit opportunities in several end-markets, thus 
setting the conditions for an increased portfolio of contracts on the same class of 
licenses. However, these advantages come with several challenges, notably the need 
for downstream market intelligence, the need to protect IP against imitation and 
efforts to reduce information asymmetry between the licensor and licensee, which 
create the potential for moral hazards. To understand how ARM BM made it possible 
to  overcome these challenges, turning them from potential threats into sources of 
competitive advantage, we need to understand the second central feature of ARM 
BM, that is the reinforcement between product architecture (in particular its 
modularity), relational capabilities and the BM. Technology modularity delivers 
innovation into specific modules, thus creating a flow of continuous (incremental) 
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innovation that is competence enhancing for both ARM and its network of exchange 
partners. This is also an enabling condition for favoring the creation of long term 
relationships, which are trust based and involve co-creation and joint development 
efforts from ARM and its exchange partners. This provides us with insight into how a 
supportive business ecosystem can be created. The ecosystem supports the innovator’s 
IP because of the reciprocal absorptive capacity developed between the licensor and 
licensee. This form of co-creation results in high switching costs for partners, which 
are locked into the relationship. As technology evolves continuously, the scaling of 
the BM is fueled by further licensing agreements and the licensor. So the licensee’s 
capabilities coevolve, reinforcing their relationship over time and making it extremely 
difficult and costly for outsiders to imitate. The BM itself becomes a source of IP 
protection. 
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ARM IPBM 
Evolutionary dynamics between IPBM and modularity 
ARM Plc. Key Features First order consequences Second order consequences 
 
IPBM 
 
 Flexible capital light model  
 
 Upstream positioning within the value 
chain far from final customers 
 
 Need to protect IP 
 License fees are not substantial 
 
 Information asymmetry between licensor 
and licensee (e.g. knowhow not fully 
codified in the license, lack of 
understanding of the manufacturing 
process or the technological roadmap) 
 
 Rapid access to market 
 
 Makes it possible to access multiple downstream markets 
simultaneously 
 
 Challenges in defining the technological roadmap 
 
 Difficulty in scaling the venture solely on the basis of 
licensing revenues  
 
 Need to develop “reciprocal absorptive capacity” (i.e., 
licensor invests in acquiring knowledge of the 
manufacturing process – licensee invests in acquiring 
technology knowhow)  
 Ability to scale (by accessing multiple markets) 
 
 Partners’ high switching costs (on the basis of 
investments in technological knowhow) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IP protection 
 
 
 
Modular 
Technological 
Architecture 
underpins 
participation in 
ecosystem 
 
 Technology embedded in modules 
evolving incrementally around a “core” 
 
 Continuous incremental innovation confined within 
modules. 
 
 Innovation is “competence enhancing” for both the 
licensor (i.e., build on its technological knowhow) and 
for the licensee (build on its acquired knowhow). 
 Long term trust based relationship sustained by 
continuous interactions (coevolution of licensor and 
licensee capabilities) 
 
 Access to downstream market intelligence 
(Licensing-in/licensing-out, reciprocal knowledge 
transfer) 
 
 Partners’ high switching costs (on the basis of 
developed mutual trust and reciprocal non-
technological absorptive capacity) 
Table 3: ARM IPBM and Key Underlying Mechanisms
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In summary, the particular configuration of ARM’s IPBM – its architectural logic and 
the nature of the relationships involved – facilitates knowledge mobility, supports 
continuous innovation, fosters reciprocal absorptive capacity and the generation of 
mutual trust, leveraging a network of partnerships in which the parties are strongly 
tied together in a mutually supportive business ecosystem. By orchestrating a 
‘relational model’ ARM creates the conditions for sustaining an interrupted flow of 
value creation for the customer while keeping customers locked into their technology. 
The resulting network architecture is costly to replicate, conferring on the firm the 
means of sustaining its competitive advantage over time. Nevertheless, in the 
technology wars that occur between leading standards, all members of an ecosystem 
are affected by the relative success of key technologies, and firms providing platform 
designs are involved in such rivalries as those between Apple and the companies 
using Android  technologies for smart phones (Müller et al., 2011)  
 
DISCUSSION  
The objective of this paper was to offer insights into the IP commercialization strategy 
of technological start-ups and investigate salient features of purely IP-based business 
models. A business model “encompasses the firm’s economic activity, how it is 
resourced, the way it creates value and how returns are to be realized” (Garnsey, 
2003). The example of ARM provides an exemplar of how a business ecosystem can 
be formed to support and sustain an innovation that is potentially vulnerable, as 
revealed by the difficulty experienced by most firms that attempt to scale up an IPBM.  
ARM’s business model is based on an open ecosystem; it is characterized by high 
transaction intensity with customer-partners and a focus on a set of core architectural 
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activities (Baden Fuller and Hefliger, 2013).  We found that ARM’s success in 
creating a worldwide leadership position only a few years after its founding can be 
traced to the manner in which it managed to craft a business model that exploits IP 
value through “two-way” licensing agreements supported by long-term partnerships 
and complementary services. Partners not only boost ARM's sales, they also add to its 
knowledge base, enhancing ARM’s ability to design chips that meet the future 
application and technological needs of its partners. Thus, the licensing/royalty model 
ties the destiny of ARM and its partners together, creating a strong business case to 
pursue joint design-wins and share the knowledge necessary to mutually maximize the 
probability of success. This business model and the ecosystem which sustained it did 
not pre-exist ARM. Nor was this business model the result of foresight or strategic 
vision. It emerged as a response to necessity and had to be operationalized gradually 
through trial and error and following a discovery-driven approach (McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2009).  
We believe that ARM’s approach represents an attractive and increasingly 
popular commercialization option in the development start-ups that are resource-
constrained and lack legitimacy. Despite being premised on the idea that start-ups can 
extract value from their know-how by patenting and selling it, the IPBM model has 
distinctive features that differentiate it from traditional licensing models, or any model 
more generally based on the sale of patents. The key difference is that the sale of IP is 
part of a complete IP capability that makes it possible to transfer idiosyncratic 
knowledge over time and to distinctive clients who have specific needs and 
requirements. This capability is designed on the principle of reciprocity. It means that 
every time ARM grants a license it tries to build a reciprocal relationship that affords 
ARM insight into the licensee partner’s technological roadmap and access to new 
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knowledge about emerging applications. Furthermore, in order to maximize the range 
of users for ARM products, the company provides a basket of supplementary tools, 
software and system IP that facilitate adoption and incorporation. Clients, in their role 
of customers-partners, are crucial contributors to the company’s knowledge base, 
enhancing the company’s ability to develop technology fitting its partners’ future 
application needs. Thus, partnerships become platforms through which the exchange 
parties jointly determine their strategic and technological trajectory.  
While the way in which business ecosystems are needed to sustain innovations 
is increasingly recognized (Adner et al 2013), there are few detailed studies of the 
specific manner in which innovative ecosystems can be created.  ARM furnishes one 
such exemplar, from which we can better understand how a key position can be 
secured by an innovator providing a critical technology adopted by other participants.  
Managers often overestimate the role of IP per se while underestimating  the 
way in which such IP must be integrated into a fully fledged IP market and 
technology strategy, as Fisher, William and Oberholzer-Gee (2013) have pointed out. 
The IP capability developed by ARM embodies much richer know-how than would be 
possible through the one-off provision of patent licenses alone. Within such a 
configuration licensing is just one component of a sophisticated approach relying on 
the maintenance and nurturing of long-term relationships with clients (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). In configuring business activities with an IPBM, the design of an 
ecosystem of exchange partners does not represent a ‘nice to have’ asset. It is a core 
constituent of the strategy, and the basis for the sustainability of the model. 
 
 
Conclusions 
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We believe our study offers valuable theoretical insights into the interplay between 
technological architecture, firm’s capabilities and the evolution of the IP BM in the 
context of an innovative ecosystem. First, our study contributes to the literature on 
modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) and architectural innovation (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990) in general and on the interdependence between technological 
architecture and firms capabilities in particular (see more specifically Henderson & 
Clark, 1990 and later studies). While the received literature has primarily focused on 
the consequences of modularity in technology design on incumbents’ survival and 
competitive dynamics, our insights underscore the role of modularity in inter-firm 
collaboration and IP protection, two aspects that have been largely overlooked by 
prior literature3. Technology modularity opens up opportunities to scale an IP BM 
because it allows the licensor to embed innovations and technological advances within 
modules that revolve around a ‘core’ that, in turn, may evolve incrementally - as 
opposed to radically. Incremental advances are “competences enhancing” (Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986) for both the licensor and the licensee because they build on their 
technological core competences (Abernathy & Clark, 1985). The latter, which is 
incremental innovation being competence enhancing for the licensor, is particularly 
important because it allows setting a precondition for long term collaboration – as 
opposed to isolated contractual agreements – and repeated interactions in which the 
licensor and licensee become partners in the creation of the next wave of 
technological innovation. It is these recurrent and sustained relationships that provide 
the basis for a sustained business ecosystem. As we have shown, this has important 
implications for creating downstream market intelligence for companies operating in 
                                                          
3
 A notable exception is represented by Henkel, Baldwin & Shih (2013). However their focus is on the 
interplay between product design, modularity and IP protection, and not on IP licensing, inter-firms 
relationships and IP protection, a conceptually distinct phenomenon.   
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the market for technologies that are disembodied from physical products (e.g. see 
Arora & Gambardella, 2010). 
Our study also speaks to the received literature on business models (e.g. see 
Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011). Our analysis of the dynamics behind the functioning of 
ARM’s BM and, more specifically, the interplay between technological architecture, 
organizational capabilities and inter-organizational knowledge transfer in an IPBM, 
suggests that shedding light on the dynamics underlying a BMs may be a non-trivial 
exercise, requiring fine-grained understanding of the organizational model subsuming 
the working of a given BM (e.g. see Morgan, Gregory & Roach 1997). To date, 
however, the BM literature has evolved rather separately from the organization design 
and organization theory literatures. The BM-organizational model duality has also 
potential implications for the literature that focuses on BMs as models, in particular 
on how BMs are enacted by organizational members into cognitive and linguistic 
devices (e.g. see Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010; Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2013). 
Within this line of inquiry, our findings point to the the importance of analyzing the 
extent to which managers form images of organizations when enacting BMs and what 
are the consequences of the presence/absence of such  images for the development of  
of BM cognitive and linguistic schema.  
Finally we find that concept of business ecosystems provides a basis for 
drawing together and integrating the diverse themes addressed in the analysis of 
reciprocal IP relationships.  This evidence also indicates that to integrate the analysis 
of business models with business ecosystems, attention must be to be paid to the 
specific nature of the relationship between participants and the manner in which 
reciprocal value creation is ensured. In the case of IP, such relationships take on a 
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character that has not received detailed analysis in the emerging ecosystem literature 
(Adner et al. 2013). 
We conclude this essay with some reflections on the role of manufacturing in a 
pure play IPBM, a theme relevant to understanding the complex nature of innovation 
ecosystems. Because manufacturing falls outside the range of activities performed 
within a typical IPBM one would expect expertise in this area not to be crucial. Yet 
technology licensing works only to the extent that the licensee is capable of 
identifying a profitable market application and is willing to make the massive 
investments that are typically required to build a plant and scale up production. But 
the licensee does not always have all the necessary manufacturing competences, 
especially in the case of disruptive technologies. If that is the case, two enabling 
conditions appear especially important for increasing the likelihood of successful 
licensing: a) the licensor’s ability to provide engineering consulting and customer 
services; b) the availability of a small scale pilot-plant which demonstrates the 
viability of the manufacturing process, thus serving as proof of concept. The 
availability of a small-scale pilot plant is particularly important in the negotiation 
phase as it can help the licensor not only to prove the feasibility of the product but 
also to address a variety of application and implementation issues that may otherwise 
deter the buyer from moving forward.   
Several of our informants at ARM pointed out the importance of having at 
least some manufacturing know-how in house to establish necessary expertise and 
credibility with manufacturers, to include them as key players in the innovator’s 
ecosystem and secure and forge enduring partnerships. This know-how, in ARM’s 
case, was developed early on through its interaction with VLSI, to which they 
outsourced the manufacturing of the very first chips. Just as important is the “package 
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of deliverables”, that is, the additional support, tools, extensions and training 
accompanying the sale of the technology. From a list of 10 deliverables that 
accompanied the first ARM product, ARM licenses in 2001 had “about 200 
deliverables”. Today ARM engineering consulting and related services contribute 
significantly to its profitability, accounting for approximately 12% (on top of the 
licensing fees and royalties) of the overall revenues (see Figure 5).   Although ARM 
does not make any manufacturing investment, ARM  has developed the capability to 
work across boundaries to support the manufacturing activities of its partners. 
 
Figure 5: Sources of revenues, ARM (2011). Source: company records 
The majority of IP-based technology startups focus on licensing their IP while leaving 
all downstream activities to the licensors, leaving them isolated within a narrow 
business ecosystem. A few companies manage to “follow the license” and share with 
the licensee at least some downstream activities and so create and capture a much 
greater share of value. Unless they can devise organizational and technological 
solutions that enable them to create relationships beyond their boundaries, new 
technology ventures adopting an IPBM are likely to face major obstacles. We have 
proposed that where strategic goals are difficult or impossible for the venture to 
achieve on its own, the innovative firm’s business model may represent an attempt to 
construct a potentially supportive ecosystem populated with actors who generate 
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value collectively  (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Baden-Fuller and 
Mangematin, 2013).  Though ARM achieved this in a unique manner, their innovative 
approach which involved building open ecosystems through learning partnerships, are 
available to other resource-constrained start ups seeking to scale up their operations.  
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